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Conflicts of Copyright Ownership Between
Authors and Owners of Original Artworks:
An Essay in Comparative and
International Private Law
by Jane C. Ginsburg*
INTRODUCTION: PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS
Most, if not all, copyright laws distinguish between ownership of the
incorporeal copyright, and ownership of chattels.' A generally-accepted
corollary holds that alienation of the chattel that constitutes the material
form of a copyrighted work does not carry the copyright with it.2
Applying this principle to works of the visual arts, it should be clear that
sale of a painting, even if it is the only "copy" 9f a work,' is not a
transfer of the exclusive rights under copyright to reproduce the work or
to create derivative works based on the painting. Similarly, ownership
of the copyright confers no rights as to the material object. The artist (or
her successor) owns the incorporeal exploitation rights; the purchaser of

the painting is entitled to the quiet enjoyment of his chattel.
However, the distinction is not as impermeable as this exposition

would suggest. On the one hand, the artist's rights, particularly her
moral rights as enforced in some countries, limit the prerogatives of the
owner of the art object.4 On the other hand, the owner may impinge
upon, or indeed fully displace, the author's pecuniary rights, in those

* Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia
University School of Law. Portions of this article are adapted from Droit d'Auteur et
Support Matdriel de l'Oeuvre d'Art en Droit Compard et en Droit International PrivY,
forthcoming in M.LANGES OFFERTS A LIHONNEUR D'ANDRi
FRANrON (1994). I thank
Professor Catherine Kessedjian and Maitre Yves Gaubiac for their suggestions regarding
French conflicts law analysis.
© Copyright 1994 Jane C. Ginsburg.
1. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1988) (ownership of copyright is distinct from ownership
of "any material object in which the work is embodied"). CODE DE LA PROPRIMT] INTELLECTUELLE (Fr.) [hereinafter C. PROP. INTELLEcTUELLE], art L. 111-3 ('"The incorporeal property
right is independent of the property right in the material object.").
2. See, e.g., laws cited supra, note 1.
3. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) ("'Copies' are material objects... in which a work is fixed
.... The term 'copies' includes the material object..

.

in which the work is first fixed.").

4. Moreover, even when the chattel owner also owns the copyright, the artist's moral
rights may in some countries constrain the exploitations the copyright owner may in fact
make. See discussion infra.
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copyright systems that presume a transfer of copyright ownership
together with the alienation of the original object, or that attribute initial
copyright ownership to the party that commissions the creation of the
artwork.
The potential conflicts between artists and artwork owners have
recently assumed an unprecedented importance. Until recently, the
market for artworks was a market for originals. The value of the
copyright rights of reproduction and adaptation was sufficiently
negligible that artists directed most of their copyright-reforming efforts
toward securing the "droit de suite," or artist's resale royalty on
subsequent transfers of the chattel.5 Now, by contrast, the market for
art "merchandizing properties" -- reproduction or adaptation of art
images on an ever-expanding variety of products, from paper goods, to
clothing, to household items, to computer screen fillers, etc. -- affords a
significant and growing source of income to copyright owners.6 Thus,
determining who is in fact the copyright owner, as between the artist
and the purchaser of the art object acquires a practical urgency. But
differences in national copyright laws, and in approaches to international
conflicts of law, may make this determination complex if not elusive.
In this Article, I will first discuss the various points of contact, or
conflict, between the rights of artists and of artwork owners in comparative law (primarily the U.S. and France). I will then consider how
international private law rules applied in the U.S. and in Europe would
(or perhaps should) designate the national law competent to resolve the
conflict in copyright ownership between artists and purchasers.
To set the stage for much of the ensuing analysis, it may be helpful to
design a problem that will bring many of the potentially conflicting
interests into play. Suppose that the Museum Shop of the [fictitious]
Museum of Moderately Modern Art (MOMMA), located in New York
City, plans to purvey a line of goods, including post cards, wall calendars, plush toys, scarves, t-shirts, waste baskets, shower curtains, and
refrigerator magnets, all incorporating full or partial reproductions or
adaptations of the work of Pablita M6tisse, a prolific and immensely
popular artist, born in Spain in the late 19th-century, but resident for
most of her career in France, where she died in 1973. The images that
MOMMA wishes to use for its "Pablita" line of merchandizing properties
are taken from paintings, some of which are in MOMMA's collection, and
others of which are in museums in France, the U.K and the Nether-

5. See generally LIUANE DE PIERREDON-FAWCErr, THE DROIT DE SUITE IN LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC PROPERTY: A COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY (Louise-Martin-Valiquette trans., John M.

Kernochan gen. ed., 1991).
6. See, e.g., Marilyn Gardner, The Fine Art of MerchandisingMuseums, LA. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 1992, at E5.
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lands. MOMMA has not obtained a license from M6tisse's heirs, her
daughters Columba and Claudia, authorizing the planned exploitation.
Moreover, neither MOMMA nor the other museums, nor purchasers
that donated Pablita M~tisse paintings to the museums, have any
contracts signed by Pablita M~tisse transferring copyright, or any rights
under copyright, to the purchasers of the paintings. However, some of the
paintings are portraits that were commissioned by the purchasers.
Others of the paintings were sold, respectively, in France in 1905 and
1925, and in New York in 1960 and (posthumously) in 1980. To what
extent, if any, do these factors form a basis for MOMMA to claim
copyright ownership in the works in its collections, and for the European
museums to claim copyright ownership in the works in theirs? Moreover,
even if MOMMA might be considered a copyright holder in the U.S.,
would its ownership be recognized abroad? Would U.S. courts recognize
the copyright ownership asserted by the European museums? Finally,
even were the museums' copyright ownership upheld, to what extent
would the artist's moral rights (asserted by Columba and 'Claudia)
compromise MOMMA's planned exploitation at home or abroad?
I. CONFLICTS BETWEEN ARTISTS AND PURCHASERS
IN COMPARATIVE LAW
Despite the distinction between copyright and chattel ownership, there
are several areas of potential conflict between the rights of artists and
of owners of art objects. Some conflicts concern moral rights, others,
pecuniary rights. In the realm of moral rights, the author's prerogatives
may impinge upon the owner's enjoyment of the original object. They
may also limit the owner's exercise of any copyright the owner has
acquired.
With respect to pecuniary rights, conflicts may arise concerning both
exercise and ownership of copyright. Two examples of interference in the
exercise of chattel or copyright rights concern, on the one hand, the
artist's access to a work in the purchaser's possession, and on the other,
a selling-owner's unauthorized publication of a reproduction of the work
in an auction catalogue. However, the most acute problems concern
copyright ownership: who is the copyright owner if the artist has
alienated the painting without reserving copyright ownership, or if the
painting was created pursuant to a commission?
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A. MORAL RIGHTS
The French copyright law declares the moral rights of attribution and
of integrity to be "perpetual, not subject to statutes of limitations, and
inalienable."' Because these moral rights are inalienable, the author
retains the power to exercise them, even if she has transferred her
pecuniary (exploitation) rights. As a result, the artist may object to
reproductions or adaptations of her work that violate its integrity, for
example by falsifying the original colors or distorting the image. The
artist may also
seek relief against alteration or destruction of the
8
original copy.

U.S. federal copyright law has, since 1990, incorporated a highly
limited protection for visual artists' rights of attribution and integrity.'
The 1990 provisions entitle the artist to seek relief against prejudicial
alterations to or destruction of original copies of artworks (or of a
limited, signed, numbered edition of no more than 200 copies). Under
these provisions, the artist enjoys no protection against objectionable
reproductions and adaptations of art images. 10 By contrast, artists'
rights acts enacted by a variety of states, including New York and
California, may extend protection against distorted reproductions of
artworks." In addition, § 43(a) of the Lanham Federal Trademarks Act
may afford a basis of relief against distorted representations falsely
attributed to the artist. 2 Finally, if the artist has retained rights under
copyright, she may invoke the exclusive right to create or authorize
derivative works against reproductions of artworks that significantly
alter the image. 3

7. C. PROP. INTELLECTUELLE, supra note 1, art. L. 121-1.

8. See Judgment of May 30, 1962, Cour d'Appel, Paris, 1962 DALLOZ JURISPRUDENCE,
at 570, note Henri Desbois (Fr.) (condemning owner/art dealer's dismemberment of a
refrigerator painted by Buffet). For an English language commentary on this affair, see
John Henry Merryman, The Refrigeratorof Bernard Buffet, 27 HAST. L.J. 1023 (1976).
9. Visual Artists' Rights Act of 1990 [herineafter VARA], incorporated at 17 U.S.C. §§
106A, 113(d) (Supp. IV 1992).
10. For a fuller discussion of the scope of VARA, see Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright in
the 101st Congress: Commentary on the Visual Artists Rights Act and the Architectural
Works Copyright ProtectionAct of 1990, 14 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 477 (1990); Robert
A. Gorman, Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 38 J. COPYRIGHT SOc'y 233 (1991).
11. See, e.g., Wojnarowicz v. American Family Association, 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (applying the New York Artists Authorship Rights Act, N.Y. Arts & Cultural Affairs
Law, § 14.03 (McKinney's Supp. 1990), against distorted representations of artist's work
attributed to artist).
12. See, e.g., Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (false
attribution of origin to British humor group Monty Python of heavily edited version of
"Monty Python's Flying Circus").
13. Cf id. (Monty Python had retained rights in the television scripts; unauthorized
editing thus created an unauthorized derivative work, in violation of the group's rights
under the U.S. copyright act).
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Thus, under both French and U.S. law, the owner of a qualifying art
object14 does not enjoy complete discretion to dispose of the physical
object as she wills. Where the owner of the artwork is also the owner of
the copyright, her freedom to exploit the copyright through the commercialization of merchandizing properties incorporating the art image will
vary depending on the differences in national copyright, and moral
rights, regimes. We will return to the application of these rules, notably,
with respect to MOMMA and its proposed "Pablita" line of merchandizing properties, after we have analyzed conflicts of ownership of pecuniary
rights, and the problem of international private law.
B. PECUNIARY RIGHTS

1. Exercise of Artists' and Owners' Property Rights
Although the copyright of artists and the chattel right of owners of art
objects are distinct properties, it is not always possible to separate the
incorporeal exploitation right from the property right in the object in
which the copyrighted work is rendered concrete. For example, suppose
the artist wishes to exercise her exclusive right of reproduction, but to
do so, she requires access to the original copy of the work, now in the
owner's hands. Must the owner's property right give way to the artist's?
Put another way, may the owner exercise his property right in a way
that frustrates the artist's realization of hers? Or suppose an owner
wishes to exercise his right to dispose of his property by selling the
painting, and, to promote the sale, wishes to reproduce and distribute
advertisements depicting the painting. On the one hand, these acts of
reproduction and distribution may be conceived as reasonable accessories
to the owner's exercise of rights; on the other, they also are invasions of
the artist's exclusive rights under copyright. Whose rights should yield?
We will examine the responses of U.S. and continental copyright law to
each of these examples.
a. Right of Access to Original Copy
The conflict in copyright and chattel rights here leads to an impasse.
Some Continental copyright laws, notably those of Germany and Spain,
provide explicitly for the artist's right of access, subject to compensating
the owner for damage and inconvenience. 5 The French copyright law
14. VARA does not apply to artworks sold before VARA's effective date, June 1, 1991.
See Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128, Title VI, § 610(a) (effective date provision).
15. An Act dealing with Copyright and Related Rights, Sept. 9,1965, art. 25 (German
copyright law) reprintedas amended in 2 COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD

(BNA), Item 1, at 4 (Supp. 1989-1990); Law on Intellectual Property, Nov. 11, 1987, art.
14(vii) (Spanish copyright law) reprintedas amended in 3 COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES
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allows authors to seek judicial relief against "the owner's notorious
abuse, preventing the exercise of the right of divulgation [public
dissemination]. " " Because the reproduction (at least the initial
reproduction) entails the "divulgation" of the work, it is possible to
conclude that the French law entitles the artist to request that the courts
order access to the artworks in order to permit her to exercise the right
of reproduction. 1 7 In the U.S., a few judicial decisions suggest that the
artist might seek similar relief.'"
b. Reproduction as an Accessory to Chattel Right
Does the art object owner's chattel right imply a right to reproduce the
art image in furtherance of the exercise of the owner's right to sell the
painting? France's highest private law court, the Cour de Cassation, in
a controversy involving the unauthorized reproduction of a painting in
an auction catalogue, recently answered "No."' 9 French law lacks an
open-ended exception akin to the U.S. fair use; were the unauthorized
reproduction to be excused, the provisions of the exemption for "brief
quotes"20 would have to apply. The lower court had so held, deeming
that the differences in dimension between the original painting and the
auction catalogue's small-scale reproduction of the entire painting
justified analogizing the reproduction to a "brief quote." The High Court
abruptly declared that a complete reproduction, however small, simply
could not be considered a "brief quote."
In the U.S., the fair use exception might prove more helpful to owners
of art works. An unauthorized reproduction in a sales catalogue or in an
advertisement might be considered an "incidental use," accessory to

OF THE WORLD (BNA), Item 1, at 5 (Supp. 1987-1988).
C. PROP. INTELLECTUELLE, supra note 1, art. L. 111-3.
16.
See Claude Colombet, M&cnat et Proprit6Littdraireet Artistique, in MIkLANGES
17.
DPDIPS A DOMINIQUE HOLLEAUX, at 61, 63 (1990).
See Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109 (Mass. 1912) (ordering heir's access to
18.
manuscripts of Mary Baker Eddy's unpublished correspondence); CCNV v. Reid, 1992
COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH), 1 26,860 (D.D.C. 1991) (settlement agreement that declared
sculptor a co-owner of copyright in commissioned sculpture enforced by ordering
recalcitrant owner of sculpture to permit artist's access to the work in order to exercise his

reproduction right).
19.

Judgment of November 5, 1993, Cour de Cassation, Assemble Pldni~re, in 159

REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR, at 320 (Jan. 1994). Compare, Judgment of
October 27, 1992, Cour de Cassation, Chambre Commerciale, Financisre et Economique,
in 156 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR, at 190 (Apr. 1993) (rejecting
infringement claim against unauthorized reproduction in a sales catalogue of t-shirts

bearing copyrighted designs; the reproduction of the designs on the t-shirts had been
licensed). In U.S. law, 17 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1988) leads to a similar result.
20.

C. PROP. INTELLECTUELLE, supra note 1, art. L. 122-5, 3°(a).
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exercise of a primary prerogative. 2 ' On the other hand, if the catalogue
containing the unauthorized reproduction served not only to inform
potential buyers, but was sold to a more general audience, the reproduction might be seen to invade the copyright owner's market for licensing
reproductions in art books, and the fair use claim might therefore fail.22
2. Copyright Ownership
Up to now, we have assumed that the distinction in property rights
between author and chattel owner has been maintained; that the artist
has not in fact transferred the copyright to the purchaser of the painting.
But what if such a transfer was presumed to have occurred, at least
where the artist delivered the painting, and expressed no retention of
copyright? Copyright laws in the U.S. and abroad have in the past, and
to some extent continue to, impose a presumption that the artist granted
the copyright where, either, the artist transferred the original artwork
without restriction, or the artwork was a commissioned work, especially
a portrait or a photograph.
a. Presumptions of Transfer of Copyright Together with the Original
Artwork
Today, both U.S. and French copyright law specify that sale of a copy
of the work, including the original copy, does not, of itself, incorporate a
transfer of the copyright.23 Moreover, both laws today subject a transfer
of copyright to the requirement of a writing signed by the author, and
the French law further requires that each right granted be the "object of
a distinct mention."24 However, the distinction between sale of the
chattel and sale of the incorporeal exploitation rights has not always
been so clear. In France, the first law declaring the distinction was
enacted in 1910. The High Court, in construing this law, has twice held
that it derogated from the general civil law principle that transfer of
ownership of the object conveyed full title, including to the copyright; the

21. Cf. Italian Book Corp. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 458 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (excusing television news program's dissemination, as part of coverage of Italian
street festival, of a portion of a copyrighted song performed during the festival).
22.
If, after Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (1994), the commercial purpose
of the reproduction is no longer presumptively fatal to a fair use defense, the inquiry into
potential market harm remains dominant. Moreover, in reversing the grant of summary
judgment to the copyright owner, the Supreme Court gave special emphasis to the
"transformative" character of defendant's parody. Reproduction of an entire artwork in a
catalogue is unlikely to be deemed a "transformative" use. On the concept of "transformative" use in fair use, see generally, Pierre Leval, Toward a FairUse Standard, 103 HARV.
L. REv. 1105 (1990).
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1988); C. PROP. INELLECTUELLE, supra note 1, art. L 111-3.
24.
17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1988); C. PROP. INTELLECTUELLE, supra note 1, art. L. 131-3.
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distinction therefore did not apply to unrestricted sales of paintings
occurring before 1910. 25
In the U.S., the 1909 Act also provided that sale of the chattel did not
of itself entail alienation of the copyright.28 However, the prior federal
copyright law applied, in general, only to published works. The states
regulated copyright in unpublished works; it is probably fair to assume
that most artworks prior to their sale would have been considered
unpublished.27 Some state courts, most importantly, those of New York,
had determined that a presumption of transfer of copyright accompanied
unrestricted transfers of the original copy of a work (e.g., painting or
manuscript).2
i. Application, Over Time, of Legislative Reversals of the Presumption
of Transfer
While the New York legislature overturned the presumption of
transfer in 1966,29 it is not clear whether the presumption would
continue to apply to sales occurring before 1966. For any states that had
followed Pushman or adopted a similar result, but had not themselves
abrogated the presumption, the 1976 Copyright Act displaces the local
solution. But the 1976 Act's reversal of the presumption did not take
effect until January 1, 1978. What of pre-1978 sales of artworks in these
states? On the one hand, continued application of the presumption would
mean that, for the duration of the copyright (50 years following the
artist's death under U.S. copyright law; 70 years following the artist's
death under the law of EC countries), the author would remain divested
of the exploitation rights; the abrogated presumption thus would remain
in force well into the twenty-first century, if not into the twenty-second.

25.
See Judgment of March 19, 1926, Cour de Cassation, Chambre Criminelle, 1927
DALLoz PtRIODIQUE ET CRITIQUE, Partie I, at 25 (Fr.) (works of, inter alia, Sisley and
Courbet); Judgment of June 16, 1982, Cour de Cassation, Premibre Chambre Civile, 1982
Bull. Civ. I, No. 228, at 196 (Fr.) (works of Renoir); 1983 DALLOZ INFORMATIONS RAPIDES,
at 96 (observations of Claude Colombet on Judgment of June 16, 1982).
26.
17 U.S.C. § 27 (1909) (repealed).
27.
For the meaning of "publication" in U.S. copyright law, see, e.g., Academy of

Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Creative House Promotions, 944 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir.
1991).
28. See, e.g. Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc., 39 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1942)
(painting); Chamberlain v. Feldman, 89 N.E.2d 863 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1949) (manuscript). The
number of States that have followed Pushman, or adopted a similar presumption, is
uncertain. -See MELVILLE B. NIMMER &DAVID NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 10.09[B]
&n.16 (1993).
29. An Act to Amend the General Business Law, in Relation to the Right to
Reproduce Works of Fine Art, 1966 Laws of N.Y., ch. 668 (amending N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. by
adding art. 12-E, §§ 223-224).
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On the other hand, usual principles of interpretation of legislative
changes hold that, in the absence of specific legislative direction, laws
that alter
property rights are not applied retroactively so as to divest the
so
owner.
However, Nimmer has suggested that, at least where the purchaser
did not, before abrogation of the presumption, rely on the presumption
by exercising rights under copyright, the legislative reversal of the
presumption should take effect."1 Where the art object owner demonstrated no expectations of copyright ownership that application of the
subsequent legislation would unsettle, it is appropriate to give the fullest
effect possible to the intervening enactment.
The problem of persistence of a parallel, contrary, rule of copyright
ownership is also present in the French copyright system, as a result of
the two High Court decisions mentioned above. But French commentators criticizing these decisions have not generally advocated a similar
approach to resolving the problem. Rather, many insist that the 1910 law
did not change the distribution of property between artists and purchasers; that the distinction between copyright and chattel had always been
present in French law, and that the 1910 law simply reaffirmed the
distinction. 2 However, one French author, granting arguendo that the
1910 law did reverse the distribution of copyright, has contended that
while the reversal might not have had an "immediate"impact, the effects
of the presumption should not linger on.'
b. Commissioned Artworks
For many commissioned artworks, the presumption of transfer, if
applicable at the time the commission was executed, would convey the
copyright to the commissioning party upon the artist's delivery of the
commissioned work. Independently of this presumption, the commissioning party might also be deemed the copyright owner by virtue of having
commissioned the work's creation.
While French copyright law has not conferred copyright on commissioning parties, other European copyright laws have, at least to some
extent. For example, the U.K. copyright law, until its 1988 general
revision, named as copyright owner (absent agreement to the contrary)

30. See, e.g., Roth v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1983) (declining to apply 1976
copyright act's work for hire provisions to a work commissioned before the act's effective

date; retroactive application would have divested the commissioning party of copyright
ownership).
31. See NIMMER, supra note 28 (discussing the New York law).
32.
See HENRi DESBOIs, LE DRorr D'AUTEuR EN FRANCE, ch. V, § 312, at p. 403 (3d
ed. 1978); Colombet, observations in DALLOZ INFORMATIONS RAPIDES, supra note 25.
33.
Pierre-Yves Gautier, Le Contrat Boulevers6: de l'Impr~visibilitM en Droit des
Proprift&sArtistiques, 1990 DALLOZ CHRONIQUE XXIV, at 131.
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the party commissioning the creation of a "photograph, portrait or

engraving."' Note that the commissioning party is the copyright owner
even if she is not the subject of the portrait or photograph.' On the
Continent, the Dutch and Belgian copyright laws confer copyright
ownership on the party commissioning the creation of a portrait.'

In the U.S. the 1976 copyright act, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Community for Creative Non Violence v. Reid,37 excludes most
commissioned artworks from works made for hire status. First, works of

fine art are not included in the limited list of categories of commissioned
works subject to work for hire status. Second, most fine artists do not
work under conditions giving rise to an "employment relationship" under

the criteria set forth in CCNV and elaborated in subsequent lower court
decisions.'
What of artworks commissioned in the U.S. before the effective date

of the 1976 copyright act? Would these have been considered works made
for hire, and therefore subject to the commissioning party's copyright
ownership? In CCNV the Supreme Court stated that prior to the 1976
act's legislative compromise on copyright ownership, worked out among
interested groups by 1965, there was no general rule that commissioned
works were works made for hire. 39 Between 1965 and 1978 some
decisions, particularly in the Second Circuit, did develop a broad
application of the works made for hire doctrine to commissioned

works." Does it follow that artworks commissioned in New York,
Connecticut and Vermont between 1965 and 1978 are subject to work

34.
Copyright Act of 1956, 4-5 Eliz. 2, ch.74, art. 4(3) (Eng.). See also An Act
Respecting Copyright, 1985 Revised Statutes of Canada, ch. C-42, § 13(2).
35.
See, e.g., Apple Corps Ltd. v. Cooper, [19931 Fleet St. Rep. 286 (Ch. div. 1992)
(Eng.) (copyright ownership of photographs taken for the album jacket of "Sergeant
Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band" held to belong to the record producer that commissioned the photographs); Planet Earth Prods. v. Rowlands, 69 Dominion L. Rep. 4th 715
(Ontario Sup. Ct, 1990) (Can.) (same result with respect of other photographs commissioned
for album jackets).
36.
Law Concerning the New Regulation of Copyright, September 23, 1912, arts. 19,
20 (Dutch copyright act) reprintedas amended in II COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE
WORLD (BNA), Item 1, at 7; Law on Copyright, March 22, 1886, art. 20 (Belgian copyright
act) reprintedas amended in I COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (BNA), Item
1, at 3. See generally Jean-Louis Bismuth, General Report, in 3 LE COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL DE L'ART ET LE DROIT [hereinafter COM. INT'L], 193, at 194-5; Philipe Coppens &
Alain Strowel, Belgian Report, in 3 COM. INT'L, 227, at 242; Anton Quaedvlieg, Dutch
Report, in 3 COM INTL, 277, at 287 (1991).
37.
490 U.S. 730 (1989).
38.
See id. at 751; see also Marco v. Accent Publishing Co., 969 F.2d 1547 (3d Cir.
1992); Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992); Playboy
Enterprises v. Dumas, 831 F. Supp. 295 (1993).
39.
CCNV, supra note 37, at 744.
40.
Id., at 748; Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Co., 369 F.2d 565
(2d Cir. 1966); Roth v. Pritikin, supra note 30.
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made for hire status, while works commissioned elsewhere are not? Or
should one simply conclude that the Second Circuit cases were wrongly
decided, and that at no point were artworks commissioned from
independent artists works made for hire? Even if one gives credence to
the Second Circuit's arguably aberrant decisions, one might, adapting
Nimmer's suggestion regarding the effect of the abrogation of the New
York State presumption of transfer, accord work for hire status only to
those commissioned works whose commissioning parties relied on their
copyright ownership before the effective date of the 1976 federal
copyright act.
At this point, we have identified many of the variables in determining
who is the copyright owner of a work of art. But so far the discussion has
addressed U.S. and foreign laws, without determining which law will
govern when the problem of copyright ownership and exploitation
presents an international (or multinational) aspect. The problem of
Pablita M6tisse and MOMMA's merchandizing properties, set forth at
the beginning of this article, is replete with such aspects, and therefore
will permit us to focus the ensuing discussion of international conflicts
of law.
II. INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE:
WHAT LAW APPLIES TO EXERCISE AND OWNERSHIP OF
COPYRIGHT IN ARTWORKS?
The Berne Convention and recent French case law supply clear
answers to some of the transnational issues posed here, and we will
address these questions first. The basic issues, however, concerning
ownership of pecuniary rights, currently lack certain resolution; they will
form the bulk of the following discussion.
A. QUESTIONS WITH ANSWERS

1. Law Applicable to Exercise of Rights
The Berne Convention designates "the law of the country where
protection is claimed" to govern the "exercise and enjoyment" of rights
under copyright.4 1 As a result, this law (often the law of the forum) will
determine the content and scope of moral and pecuniary rights in
artworks (and other works of authorship). The Berne Convention thus
establishes the rule of national treatment, under which a foreign Berne

41.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 5.2.
Unless otherwise noted, all references are to the 1971 Paris Text of the Berne Convention,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1986) [hereinafter Berne or Berne
Convention].
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Union author receives the same treatment as local authors in the
country in which the Unionist author claims protection. It follows that,
for example, the French authorities having recognized the artist's right
to oppose the art object owner's reproduction of the painting in a
catalogue, an American artist whose work is sold at the Hbtel Drouot
auction house in Paris may also prevent the unlicensed reproduction of
her work in the catalogue. By the same token, a French artist whose
1992 canvas is mutilated that year in Missouri would be entitled to the
full extent of integrity rights granted U.S. artists by the 1990 Visual
Artists' Rights Act of 1990.42
2. French Law Enforcement of Foreign Creators' Moral Rights
While the Berne Convention assimilates foreign authors to nationals
with respect to the exercise of rights under copyright, it does not clearly
set forth who has standing to invoke those rights. Nonetheless, with
respect to the moral rights of attribution and integrity, the French High
Court has answered that question for claims seeking to enforce those
rights in France. In Huston v. La Cinq, the Court applied French law in
order to attribute authorship status and the right to sue in France to
defend the moral rights of attribution and integrity to all creators,
whatever their employment status or enjoyment of copyright in the
work's country of origin or in the country of which the creator is a
national or domiciliary.' 3
It follows that, according to French conflict of laws rules, a foreign
author, even if she is not a copyright owner, always maintains the right
to ensure that exploitations made of her work in France respect her
rights of attribution and integrity. For example, returning to MOMMA

Because VARA does not protect against distorted reproductions of artworks, the
42.
artist, whether American or foreign, would have no claim under the federal copyright act

unless she were also the owner of the derivative works right, in which case she could bring
a copyright infringement claim. For artists who are no longer copyright owners, state laws,
such as the New York Artists Authorship Act, supra note 11, would, where applicable,
assist foreign authors as well as locals. However, the state right might conflict with the
federal copyright law where the artist is seeking to prevent exercise of a copyright grantee's
derivative works right. Under these circumstances, the state law might be preempted. See,
e.g., Edward J. Damich, The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act: A Comparative
Critique, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1733 (1984). On the related area of invocation of state
protection of the droit de suite by foreign artists, and possible preemption of the state law,
see Lee D. Neumann, The Berne Convention and the Droit de Suite Legislation in the United
States: Domestic and InternationalConsequences of FederalIncorporationof State Law for
Treaty Implementation, 16 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 157 (1992).
Decision of May 28, 1991, Cour de Cassation, Premisre Chambre Civile, 1991
43.
JURIS CLASSEUR PtRIODIQUE II 21731, note Andrd Frangon. For an English-language
commentary on this decision, see Jane Ginsburg & Pierre Sirinelli, Authors and
Exploitationsin InternationalPrivateLaw: The French Supreme Courtand the Huston Film
Colorization Controversy, 15 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 135 (1991).
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and its proposed "Pablita" line of merchandizing properties, Columba and
Claudia would have a claim against French exploiters of the Pablita
properties if the items deformed the originals, such as by presenting a
complete line of scarves in every possible color combination, depicting an
image originally rendered by Pablita M6tisse in monochrome. As a result
of the Huston decision, it seems clear that Columba and Claudia would
maintain the right to advance their claim even if, for example, the
French exploiter was MOMMA's licensee, and MOMMA had acquired the
work from a donor who claimed title to the copyright through a pre-1910
purchase of one of Pablita's early, "Purple Period," works.
B. QUESTIONS WITHOUT CLEAR ANSWERS: WHAT LAW DETERMINES
WHO OWNS THE PECUNIARY RIGHTS IN WORKS OF ART?
In the absence of Berne Convention direction, many questions arise
concerning international legislative competence to determine ownership
of pecuniary rights under copyright. One series of questions addresses
the law normally competent to determine ownership; another inquires
whether local public policy ("ordre public") imperatives require rejection
of the normally competent law in favor of application of local rules. The
first series of questions requires treatment of the problems of presumption of transfer on the one hand, and commissioned artworks on the
other.
1. The Normally Applicable Law
The transaction between the artist and the purchaser is contractual,
and contract choice of law rules would therefore apply. However, the
potential subject matter of the contract -- transfer of copyright as well as
of the corporeal object -- complicates the selection of the choice of law
rule. Both U.S. and foreign authorities agree that the law of the country
of protection (i.e., each country where the copyright is exploited) defines
the nature and scope of what rights under copyright may be granted for
that territory. 44 On the other hand, most of these authorities would not

44. See, e.g., Rules Proposed in Relation to Intellectual PropertyRights, for Inclusion
in a Convention on Private International Law in the Member States of the European
Economic Community, art. F(1)(a) in EUGEN ULMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS [hereinafter ULMER], at 99; ULMER § 68, at 46; Henri Desbois,
observations on the Decision May 16, 1972, Tribunal de Grande Instance, Bayonne, 25
REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 624 (1972); see also MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
PAUL E. GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, § 3[11 (1991); Campbell

Connelly & Co. v. Noble, [1963] 1 All Eng. L. Rep. 237 (Ch. div. 1962) (in English law

contract, American law governs question of whether second term of U.S. copyright is
assignable); Corcovado Music Corp. v. Hollis Music, 981 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1993) (same, with
respect to Brazilian law contract).
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subject the form or procedure of the transfer to the law governing
protection of the copyright.' In other words, the author, even in an
international contract, may not grant rights that are unavailable or
inalienable in the country of protection; but if the rights are available for
transfer, then the law of the contract determines whether, and by what
means, the transfer has occurred.
In the context of presumptions of transfers of copyright ownership of
works of art, the question that primarily concerns us is not whether the
reproduction and adaptation rights in works of art are assignable, but
whether the author should be deemed to have assigned them. Hence the
contract choice of law qualification. The problem of the domain of the law
of the country of protection is reduced because the rights that would be
transferred are generally available for transfer in most copyright systems
(subject to the reserve of moral rights). However, local law may limit the
scope of the transfer of these rights to, for example, means of exploitation
known at the time of the transfer. Thus, for example, a pre-1910 transfer
might not, in France or Germany, be deemed to cover reproductions of
the art work on computer screens.4"
Turning, therefore, to applicable contract choice of law rules, we will
assume that the contract between the artist and the purchaser (if,
indeed, there was a written contract) did not specify a national, or state,
law applicable to their transaction. The U.S. conflicts approach,
expressed in the Restatement, Second, of Conflict of Laws, directs the
court, in the absence of a law chosen by the parties, to apply the law of
the "most significant relationship."47 Factors to consider include: "the
place of contracting; the place of negotiation of the contract; the place of
performance; the location of the subject matter of the contract; and the
domicile, residency, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties."' In the context of sales of artworks, the
country of sale and the nationality, domicile or residence of the parties,
appear to be the most important considerations.

45. See authorities cited supra note 44. But compare Campbell Connelly, supra note
44, with Corcovado, supra note 44: in controversies determining whether a contract
purporting to grant full-term worldwide rights granted the renewal term of U.S. copyright
under the 1909 Act, the English court held U.S. law governed the question of whether the
second term was assignable, but English law governed whether the contract's language was
effective to grant the second term; by contrast, the U.S. court held U.S. law not only
governed whether the renewal term was assignable at all, but also whether the contract's
language was effective.
46. See, e.g., ULMER, supra note 44, § 70 (discussing German copyright law of 1965,
art 31.4). The French copyright law, C. PROP. INTELLECTUELLE, supra note 1, art. L. 1-1316, permits transfer of rights to exploit the work through means unknown or unanticipated
at the time of contracting, but requires that such a grant be explicit.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 6, 188 (1988).
47.
Id., § 188(2).
48.
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European Community countries might apply the choice of law rules set

forth in the 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual

obligations.4 9 It provides that, in the absence of a law chosen by the
parties to the contract, the applicable law is the one that has the closest
ties to the contract: the Convention presumes that "the contract is most

closely connected with the country where the party who is to effect the
performance which is characteristic of the contract has, at the time of
conclusion of the contract, his habitual residence ....."' In our case,

the party owing the characteristic performance is the artist.5 1 The law
of the artist's residence at the time of the sale of the painting is therefore
competent.
a. Presumption of Transfer of Copyright with the Sale of the Original
Copy
Let us apply the Restatement and Rome Convention rules to the
Pablita M~tisse merchandising properties. Suppose that in 1905 Pablita,

then resident in France, had sold a "Purple Period" painting through a
New York gallery to a New York buyer. Under the Restatement
approach, New York law would probably apply, because the greatest
number of contacts are grouped in New York. Under New York law at
the time, the buyer would own the copyright, absent a reservation of

rights by the artist. 2 Under the Rome Convention, New York might
also be considered to have the closest relationship to the contract. Even
if the law of Pablita's then-residence were to apply, the result would be

49. Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, opened for
signature June 19, 1980, 23 O.J. No. L. 266/1 (1980).
50. Id., arts 4.1, 4.2. The Rome Convention provides that it does not apply to
contracts entered into before the Act's effective date, see id., art. 17, but courts might
nonetheless apply the choice of rule it sets forth, notably because it corresponds to the
choice of law rule propounded by other international private law conventions in the
contracts field. See, e.g., Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to the International Sale
of Goods, June 15, 1955, 510 U.N.T.S. 149 (1964) [hereinafter 1955 Hague Convention] and
Hague Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Oct. 30, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1573 [hereinafter 1985 Hague Draft Convention]. The
former convention designates the internal law of the country where the seller has its
habitual residence, see 1955 Hague Convention, art. 3. The latter designates the law of the
seller's principal place of business, 1985 Hague Draft Convention, art. 8.1, or the law
having the closest relationship to the parties and their transaction, see 1985 Hague Draft
Convention, art. 8.3. Neither of these conventions applies directly to the problem discussed
in this article, because both concern only the sale of corporeal goods, and because both
exclude transfers of property rights, see 1955 Hague Convention, art. 5.3; 1985 Hague Draft
Convention, art. 5c.
51. See ULMER, supra note 44, Rule F(2).
52. Although the New York Court of Appeals did not announce the presumption of
transfer of a copyright until 1942, it derived the presumption from an 1872 decision, Parton
v. Prang, 18 F.Cas. 1273 (C.C.D. Mass. 1872).
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the same, because in France, pre-1910 sales of artworks were presumed
to transfer the copyright as well. 3
If, on the other hand, the facts remained the same, except that the
sale occurred in New York in 1960, Pablita would retain the copyright
if French law applied, while under New York law, she would still be
presumed to have alienated it. As to which of these laws applies, U.S.
courts, applying the Restatement, would most likely designate New York
law, EC country courts applying the Rome Convention might select New
York law, as the law of the most significant relationship, or might
designate French law, as the law of the residence of the party owing the
"characteristic performance." Choice of forum (U.S. or E.C.), therefore,
could determine the identity of the copyright owner.
Suppose instead that the sale, to a New York buyer, occurred in
France in 1925. Here, both the Restatement and the Rome Convention
would most likely designate French law, which by 1925 no longer
presumptively divested the artist of her copyright.
Finally, suppose that Pablita had resided in New York from 1960 to
1970, and that she had sold works in New York to New York and to
French buyers. Suppose also that some of her works were sold posthumously in New York in 1980. With respect to the posthumous sales,
because they occur after the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act,
there would no longer be a presumption of transfer under U.S. law, nor
would there be such a presumption under French law. Whatever the
applicable law, therefore, the result is the same: the copyright remains
with the artist, or her heirs.
With respect to the inter vivos 1960-1970 sales, these should be
divided between pre-1966 and 1966-1970 sales. The latter group,
occurring subsequent to New York's abrogation of the presumption of
transfer, produces the same result as the posthumous sales. Analysis of
the former group may yield different results under the Restatement and
the Rome Convention. For pre-1966 sales to New Yorkers, both the
Restatement and the Rome Convention point to application of New York
law, and its presumption of transfer: most contacts are to New York, and
Pablita was at the time a New York resident. By contrast, for pre-1966
sales in New York to French buyers, while Pablita's then-New York
residence might lead, under Rome Convention criteria, to application of
New York law, under the Restatement, which takes into account both
parties' nationality (as well as residence), French law might well apply.

53.

See supra note 25 and accompanying discussion.
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b. Copyright Ownership of Commissioned Artworks

If the work at issue was the object of a commission, and, under some
countries' copyright laws, the copyright would belong to the commissioning party, one question is whether title to the copyright is considered
to vest initially in the commissioning party, or whether the copyright
vests (fleetingly) in the author, but is presumptively transferred to the
co-contractant. In the latter case, one would continue to apply the
contracts choice of law rules already discussed, although the conflicts
analysis under the Restatement would look to factors additional to those
reviewed above. Here, the place not only of sale, but of performance, that
is, of execution of the artwork (for example of a portrait), may affect the
determination of the applicable law. The Restatement, in addition to
setting forth the factors listed above, further states: "if the place of
negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in the same
state, the local law of the state will usually be applied."5' 5
However, if the commissioning party (or employer) is the initial
copyright owner, as in the U.S. regime of works made for hire, another
choice of law approach is warranted. I have elsewhere recommended
application of the law of the work's country of origin to determine initial
title to copyright when the work is for hire (or its foreign equivalent).'
The recommendation contemplated works destined for broad international dissemination; in seemed undesirable to subject the exploitation of
these works to the uncertainty that would result from imposition of
different national laws regarding copyright ownership. It should be
possible to grant reproduction, derivative work, and public performance
rights in a work for exploitation in many countries without subjecting
the title of the licensee to local challenge. In the context of commissioned
artworks, it seems unlikely that, at the time of the commission, the
parties contemplated this kind of exploitation of, for example, a portrait.
Nonetheless, even if the initial rationale does not apply to commissioned
artworks, there may still be good reasons to apply the law of the country
of the work's origin. In fact, as we will see, this law will generally
coincide with the law designated by the contracts conflicts rule already
discussed.
According to the Berne Convention, a work's country of origin is the
country of first publication; for unpublished works, it is the country of

54.
See supra notes 34-36 for countries and conditions under which commissioning
parties may own the copyright in the resulting artworks.
55.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 118(3) (1988).
56. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Note on the Decision ofMarch 14, 1991 of the Cour d'Appel
deParis,1992 JURIS CLASSEUR PERIODIQUE 1121780; Jane C. Ginsburg, Les Conflits de Lois
Relatifs au TitulaireInitial du Droit d'Auteur, CAHIERS DU DROIT D'AUTEUR, No. 18, at 1
(July-August 1989); Jane C. Ginsburg, Colors in Conflicts: Moral Rights and the Foreign
Exploitation of Colorized U.S. Motion Pictures, 36 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 81, 98 (1988).
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which the author is a national or domiciliary.57 Because the dispute
concerns ownership of pecuniary exploitation rights, unpublished works
will generally be at issue; the dispute arises when the author or
commissioning party seeks for the first time to exercise reproduction or
derivative works rights. Moreover, even if the commissioning party has
already undertaken to exploit the copyright, these acts do not constitute
a "publication" if the commissioning party was not in fact the copyright
owner. A publication that the copyright owner has not authorized is not
a valid "first publication;" despite the work's dissemination, the work
remains formally "unpublished."'
As a result, the law of the artist's nationality or domicile will
determine copyright ownership. However, the artist's nationality may not
always be the same as her domicile. For example, if Pablita Mdtisse,
albeit a Spanish national, lived in England from 1950-1960, and there
painted a portrait on commission, the law of her British domicile would
confer the copyright on the commissioning party, while the law .of her
nationality (which, for present purposes we will assume to be very
similar to French law), would maintain the artist's ownership of the
copyright. Because the general trend in international choice of law
conventions designates the law of the parties' "habitual residence" rather
than of their nationality, 9 we will consider that the country of origin
ofI Designating
an unpublished work is the country of the author's domicile.
the competence of the law of the author's domicile to
determine initial title to copyright, however, may occasionally produce
arbitrary results. For example, suppose that Pablita Mdtisse, then
residing in England, returned temporarily to France to paint a commissioned portrait of a French national and domiciliary. She executed and
sold the painting in France, where it remained. Despite Pablita's British
domicile (under whose law copyright ownership would pass to the
commissioning party), the country with the "most significant relationship" to the transaction is clearly France, under whose law copyright
would remain with the artist. It therefore seems appropriate to introduce
the same flexibility into the choice of law rule for determining initial title
to copyright as the Rome Convention extends to determining the law
applicable to contractual obligations: while the applicable law is
presumptively that of the artist's residence, if the "closest ties" are to
another country's law, the latter will apply.

Berne Convention, supra note 41, art. 5(4).
57.
See id., art. 3.3 ("The expression 'published works' means works published with
58.
the consent of their authors."); accord American Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences

v. Creative House Promotions, supra note 27.
See, e.g., 1955 Hague Convention and 1986 Hague Draft Convention, supra note
59.
50; Rome Convention, supra note 49. Moreover, most common law and Latin American
countries apply the law of the parties' domicile rather than of their nationality. See Y.
LoussouARN & P. BOUREL, DROIr INTERNATIONAL PRIVt, 149 (4th Ed. 1993).
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Applying these choice of law rules to another example of a work
commissioned from Pablita Mdtisse (here a French resident), suppose a
Dutch national engaged Mdtisse to paint a portrait of her husband, also
a Dutch national, with sittings and delivery of the portrait to occur in
the Netherlands. Under the analysis here proposed, it does not matter
whether, under Dutch law, copyright ownership of a commissioned
portrait vests initially in the commissioning party, or is presumed to be
transferred from the artist. Under the country of origin (modified by the
most significant relationship test) approach, as well as under Rome
Convention (and, for that matter, under the Restatement), Dutch law has
the "closest ties" to the transaction, and would therefore apply, despite
Pablita's French residence, and the party commissioning the portrait
would be deemed the copyright holder. Suppose instead that the sittings
and delivery occurred in Pablita's studio in Paris. In that case, all the
rules rehearsed above would point toward French law, and Mdtisse
would retain the copyright.
2. Eviction of the Normally Competent Law by the Forum's
"OrdrePublic"
The courts of France and of other continental countries that follow
traditional conflicts analysis sometimes palliate the designation of a
foreign law that would result in application of a rule the forum finds
extremely unappealing, by holding that the result violates the forum's
"ordre public" (weakly translated as "public policy"), and therefore
applying the forum's substantive rule instead.' The Rome Convention
allows limited leeway for signatories to decline to apply the law whose
competence the Convention designates. The Convention states that "[tihe
application of a rule of the law of any country... may be refused only
if such application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy
61
('ordrepublic') of the forum." '
Therefore, in order to determine whether a European, and particularly
a French court, would reject a foreign law designated by the law of the
work's country of origin or by the Rome Convention, whose application
would confer copyright on the purchaser or commissioning party rather
than on the author, it is necessary to determine whether vesting
copyright in a person other than the author is "manifestly incompatible"
with local public policy. For example, if MOMMA sought to license a
French entity to exploit merchandising properties based on the works of
Pablita Mdtisse sold in New York to New York buyers during the 1950s,
or based on portraits commissioned by English and Dutch residents and

60. See generally HENRI BATIFFOL & PAUL LAGARDE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIV2,
Tome 1, 409-428 (7th ed. 1981).
61.
Rome Convention, supra note 49, art. 16.
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executed by Pablita in those countries, could Pablita's heirs successfully
invoke French "ordrepublic" to challenge the copyright title MOMMA
acquired from the purchasers of the works at issue?
While French courts have invoked local "ordre public" to invalidate
transfers of moral rights, they have not found an international contract's
disposition of pecuniary rights to violate local public policy, even though
the arrangement would not have been permissible in a contract governed
by French law.12 It would therefore seem that application of New York,
English, or Dutch law to the Pablita M6tisse works in question, thus
depriving the author of pecuniary rights in these works, would not run
afoul French conflicts doctrine.
However, one might contend that it is one thing when an author
enters into an international contract and knowingly conveys rights under
terms inconsistent with French law, but permissible under the law of the
contract; it is another when the author never explicitly conferred any
rights under copyright, rather the copyright was simply presumed to be
granted along with the primary object of the transaction, the corporeal
work of art. Arguably, French public policy would be more offended at
the latter outcome than the former. This argument would be more
convincing if French authorities had demonstrated, as a matter of
domestic law, that presumptions of transfer of copyright in artworks
violate local public policy. But the High Court's decisions, including one
of fairly recent date, continuing to enforce the effects of the pre-1910
presumptions of transfer, undercut the strength of the "ordrepublic"
contention.
Finally, one could contend that the rights at issue are not purely
pecuniary. Rather, since they include the right to publicly disseminate,
perhaps for the first time, images of the work, the moral right of
divulgation is also implicated. If French courts are more solicitous to
preserve French law protection of moral than pecuniary rights in
international contracts, perhaps "ordrepublic"would come into play were
the "moral" aspect of the contract highlighted. There are at least two

62.

See, e.g., Decision of February 1, 1989, Cour d'Appel, Paris, Premiere Chambre,

142 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 301 (1989), note Pierre Sirinelli. In this

case, in a contract governed by New York law, a French author agreed to be a ghost writer,
thus transferring her moral right of attribution to a credited co-writer (a French national
resident in New York), and also agreed to accept a lump sum payment, instead of
proportional remuneration, as would have been required under French law. The court held
the contract to violate French "ordre public" insofar as it alienated the moral right of
attribution. By contrast, the court also held that the contract's arrangements for pecuniary
compensation, albeit at variance with French law, did not violate "ordrepublic." See also,
Decision of March 14, 1991, 1992 JURIS CLASSEUR PtRIODIQUE II 21780, note Jane
Ginsburg, where the court held that the Italian copyright law's work made for hire
provision, conferring on an employer initial title to pecuniary rights in employee-created
designs, is "in no way contrary to 'ordrepublic' as understood in French private international law."
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problems with this argument. First, the moral rights to which French
courts have given international precedence are the rights of attribution
and integrity. These are the only moral rights mentioned in the 1964
law, cited by the Huston court, which sets forth the terms under which
foreign works will be protected.' The other moral rights, of divulgation
and "repentance,"' appear to be of less moment for international
private law. Second, the moral right of divulgation is not absolute.
Although the law provides that "only the author has the right to divulge
the work,"' it also states that in the event of "notorious abuse in the
use or nonuse" of the right of divulgation by the author's heirs, a court
may order the work to be divulged." When a right is qualified as a
matter of domestic law, it is less likely that it will be deemed to express
the kind of exceptionally strong public policy that warrants displacing an
otherwise competent, albeit contrary, foreign law.67
CONCLUSION
Once the forum applies its conflicts rules to designate a law competent
to determine copyright ownership of pecuniary rights, it appears that the
forum will not unsettle this designation through imposition of the "ordre
public" exception. The law that EC member countries' courts would deem
normally competent to determine whether the purchaser of the original
artwork also owns the pecuniary rights should be the law of the artist's
residence at the time of the sale, or the national (or state) law with the
most significant relationship to the artist, the purchaser, and the
transaction. U.S. courts would probably also apply the most significant
relationship test to determine whether there has been a transfer of
copyright with the canvas. Where the artist has created the work on
commission, the forum (whether U.S. or E.C.) should apply the law of the
work's country of origin -- the artist's then-residence -- or, if that law's

relationship to the transaction seems too slim, then the law of the most
significant relationship, to determine initial title to the copyright.
Thus, if a French or European court applies the law of the contract or
of the country of origin to deem MOMMA (or its predecessors) the
copyright owner of the Pablita M6tisse works at issue, it seems likely
that the designation will not be disturbed. However, it is important to

63.
C. PROP. INTELLECTUELLE, supra note 1, art. L-111-4. The second paragraph of
this provision states, "In any event there may be no violation of the integrity or paternity
of these [foreign] works."
64.
See id., arts. L-121-2 (divulgation), L-121-4 (repentance).

65. Id., art. L-121-2.
66. Id., art. L-121-3.
67. On the "attenuated effect" ["effet attenu6"j of the forum's "ordrepublic" on a
transaction to which a foreign law normally applies, see generally BATIFFOL & LAGARDE,
supra note 59, at 424-426.
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recall that the law of the country of protection determines which, and to
what extent, rights may be granted. Thus, even a foreign court, applying
its choice of law rules, identifies MOMMA as the copyright owner by
presumption of transfer, the scope of the rights MOMMA owns will
nonetheless be defined by the domestic copyright law of the country
where protection is sought. That law may exclude means of exploitation
unknown at the time of the transfer. As a result, despite recognition of
its title to pecuniary rights, MOMMA's ability to license certain forms of
exploitation, notably those involving technologies unknown at the time
of acquisition of the copyright, may be more limited in some fora than in
others. Moreover, before the courts of France and many other European
countries, Pablita Mdtisse, and now her heirs, Columba and Claudia, will
always retain the moral rights of attribution and integrity, and may
invoke these against MOMMA's French and other European
exploitations.

